In
 the
 last
 twenty‐five
 years
 there
 has
 been
 a
 significant
 change
 in
 the
 way
 political
 communities
 deal
 with
 their
 past.
 A
 “national”
 policy
 of
 remembrance,
 which
 highlights
 the
 heroic
 deeds
 of
 its
 members,
 commemorates
 its
 own
 victims
 and
 crimes
 inflicted
 by
 other
 entities,
 and
 forgets
 about
 crimes
 committed
 in
 the
 name
 of
 one’s
 own
 community
 seems
 to
 be
 replaced
 by
 a
 “post‐national”
 policy
 of
 remebrance.
 In
 several
 countries
 dealing
 with
 the
 dark
 sides
 of
 one’s
 history
 has
 become
 a
 significant
 topos within
 a 
policy
 of
 remembrance
 and
 cultural
 commemoration.
 In
 contrast,
 a
 country
 like
 Russia
 refuses
 to
 step
 into
 this
 process
 of
 establishing
 a
 new
 post‐national
 régime
 d’historicité and
 refers
 to
 history
 only
 in
 order
 to
 strengthen
 its
 national
 identity:
 While
 remembering
 its
 effort
 in
 defeating
 Germany
 in
 the
 “Great

Fatherland
 War,”
 Russian 
society 
forgets 
about
 the
 trauma 
of 
the 
Gulag 
and 
crimes 
committed 
in 
its 
name 
in
 other
 former
 states
 of
 the
 Soviet
 Union.
 My
 paper
 argues
 that
 the
 specific
 setting
 of
 Russia’s
 official
 policy
 of
 remembrance
 is
 due
 to
 the
 notion
 of
 a
 society
 of
 heroes
 once
 forcibly
 institutionalized
 as
 the
constitutive
 historiographical
 principle
 by
 Stalin’s
 regime.
 Regarding
 to
 the
 discourse
 in
 the
 field
 of
 memory
 such
 a
 forced
 interconnection
 between
 historiography
 and
 memory
 could
 be
 characterized
 as
 "occupied
 memory."
 Although
 Russia’s
 official
 policy
 of
 remembrance
 passed
 through
 several
 quite
 different
 phases,
 nowadays,
 however,
 a
 critical
 approach
 to
 Russia’s
 past
 has
 been
 replaced
 by
 a
 “patriotic
 consensus”
 that 
expresses 
a 
new
 – 
or 
better 
– 
an 
old 
Russian 
concept 
of 
identity.